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THE RETURN OF THE LIBERAL SENSIBILITY IN EUROPE

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Abstract

After the 9/11, a new set of ideas and policies about security and religious identity came into being in Europe. This paper argues that the perceptions and policies of some European states began to turn against certain religious groups (especially Muslims) as sources of insecurity. It finds that draconian measures against newfound agents of insecurity lead some European states to diverge from the official narratives and practices of multiculturalism. It also points that in this context there has been a transformation into a distinct political practice called the 'liberal sensibility'.

Introduction

In the post-September 11 era, in line with the changing nature of international security conduct, security perceptions of some western European states have come to bear distinct cultural and religious marks. European security is no longer simply a *defensive* conception based on state-centric, external-military conception; but more an *offensive* logic which puts certain (cultural characteristics of) citizenry at the central stage of threat construction. This new process seems to have led to a reconsideration of the tolerant security conception. Certain state practices now seem to operate on a modern security logic, consuming security vis-à-vis certain societal elements. On the one hand, this situation reflects how threat constructions at the domestic level can generate a different configuration of public sphere in relation to citizenship. On the other, it also generates situations in which states put discriminating and demonizing emphasis on certain attributes of religious citizenry particularly of Islamic societal elements. Recent political discussions abound in this effect. It is believed that for their own security some European states should guard their 'authentic' socio-cultural aspects from the unauthentic 'enemy within' and return to promoting certain cul-

tural and social identity roots, such as mono-cultural and mono-lingual characteristics. Before we look at the changing security agenda in Europe though, we first briefly present a theoretical background of dominant theoretical and conceptual approaches in security studies field and provide a criticism of these approaches. This can help us to have a contrasting base for our discussion.

Traditional Approaches to Security

Amongst the post-war IR security studies, realistic ones have been the most influential. Surviving the theoretical and intellectual challenges of the early 1990s, the realistic formulations of security remained central and helped perceive the world within a rationalist/neorealist¹ canon of scientific inquiry (Krause and Williams, 1997). Realism mainly understands security as relating primarily to the external and military practices of states. In other words, realists promote an understanding of security that focuses on the external aspects of the unit of analysis, namely the state, seen as a unitary actor responding to external threats emanating from other states (for example, see Walt, 1991). These analyses presume 'preestablished states with secure identities' (Campbell, 1998:68). In addition, these accounts of security designate a 'self-help' international political system that comprises states as the basic unit of analysis. According to this dominant security formula, the 'independent variables' of military-material capabilities and offensive/defensive intentions lead states to go for predictable power balancing behaviors (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1991; Mearsheimer, 1994/5; Scheweller, 1996). The framework of this traditional approach provides a universalistic approach. Its assumptions are taken as universally and historically applicable, for it takes the 'object of study', na-

¹ We will use the terms 'traditional', 'neorealist' and 'rationalist' approaches interchangeably in this article.

mely states, as the 'like-units' or 'functionally-alike', which in turn renders these 'objects' ahistorical and universal (Glaser, 1997). Indeed, as Waltz claims in explaining state behavior, it becomes irrelevant 'whether states are revolutionary or *legitimate*, authoritarian or democratic, ideological or pragmatic' (Linklater, 1995:252, emphasis added).

Critics argue that it is this realist universalistic illusion that obscures our understanding of what the quest for 'security' might mean in divergent political and cultural contexts. They claim that taking the state as a unitary and ahistorical 'object' does not help much to understand on what cultural and historical bases states sit. That is, if the aim is to explain security behaviors of states, then the realist security provides little help in questioning how and why we are provided with states rather than, say, empires or tribes in world politics. Ignoring cultural and historical foundations of states would lead to a standard westernized treatment of the divergent units as like-units. The moral implication, on the other hand, could also be a self-indulgent tribute to one's own standards that fail to comprehend the sociopolitical realities of other states with different historical trajectories. Then, it is important for practical and moral reasons at least to point out varying characteristics or attributes of states in any given international system. Luckily, since the late 1980s there emerged alternative outlooks of security in world politics ranging from feminists to postmodern perspectives of security. Social constructivist security studies (SC) provide one of such alternative visions of security.

For SC, the connection between identities and security interests is such that identities help actors find lenses to define/adopt and play the expected roles in a given security situation. Social identities and specific configuration of those identities in world politics produce national interests (Weldes, 1996). The direction of identity construction (e.g., enmity / amity / rivalry) can be known by investigating how 'self' and 'other' are represented and appropriated in state practices over time. That is, for instance, enemies are constructed through representations of the 'other' as an actor, 'who ... will not willingly limit its violence toward the "Self"' (Wendt, 1999:260). Enmity, in turn, differs from the concept of rivalry, where the latter has limited intentions over the 'other' and recognizes the right of his existence as an 'autonomous being'. Enmity relations recognize no internal limits in violence expectancy, apart from the 'balance of power', 'exhaustion', or other external constraints. Contra enmity, rivalry has 'self-limiting' or constraining characteristics (Wendt, 1999:261). There are mainly four consequential ways that follow the representations of the 'other' as 'enemy', which in turn give way to sta-

te action (Wendt, 1999:262). In the first case, states tend to act in a 'revisionist' manner thinking of destruction and / or conquest even if the apparent interests of states (e.g., being a *status quo* state) do not associate with the actual outcomes. Secondly, future projections / plans will be evaluated on a 'worst-case' base and the probability of a cooperative move would be discarded. Thirdly, power will be prime value and the prediction of behavior will mainly be done according to the relative military capabilities while turning a *hypothetical probability* of a surprise attack into a negative and highly expected *possibility*. Lastly, it encourages a pre-emptive strike on the 'other' when it deems necessary and ripe (Wendt, 1999:262).

Changing security perception in some European Countries

The symbolic starting point for the changed security paradigm in European states can be traced back to the attack of 9/11 in 2001 in that it has given new momentum to a novelty in the European security perceptions. At the macro strategic policy level, the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS), by itself highly symbolic for this development, identified key threats to the security of the EU as religious extremism or radicalism in addition to terrorism, Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), failed or failing states (such as the Balkans states after the cold war), organized crime and regional conflict. This paradigm is reflected directly in the strategy document as well: "The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society." (European Security Strategy, 2003:3).

Before we analyze the changing security construction in Europe after the 9/11, we have to examine EU security and counter-terrorism approach effective for the period between 1990 and 2001. In the 1990s, terrorism received major interest from both the US government and academics and was recognized as an important threat to US national security. In Europe however, it did not hit the red alert as a serious common threat to all. Later after 1989, several new elements were added to the security discourse in Europe: environment, immigrants, ethnic conflict, organized crime and terrorism. The list in Europe achieved maximum breadth covering all sectors, almost all levels. The issues were normally not new, but with the end of the Cold War they became *articulated* as security problems. But all these were not really providing the main twist about the insecurity concerns on the European scene. As argued forcefully by Buzan and Wa-

ever (2003:356), the strongest security discourse in post-cold war Europe has rather been the argument that Europe has to avoid a *return* to its own notorious past of wars and power balancing therefore integration was a panacea and a necessity. In this security perception, 'Europe' became the referent object of security, and will be lost in a fragmentation scenario. In this discourse, Europe's other is neither Russia nor even Turkey or Islamic fundamentalism. Instead, Europe's other is Europe's own past. The discussions surrounding 'European security' often refer exactly to this argument, and underpin the security of individual states as a whole. In this paradigm a referent object of security was the state.

On the other hand, the other main security argument has been the reverse of the first. European integration itself is presented as threat, primarily to national identity. In this discourse, national identity started to become another referent object of security in the context of the integrationist discussions and policy. The wars in the Balkans have generally served to strengthen this discourse. They reintroduced the idea that war in Europe is possible. The Balkan wars of the early 1990's have also served as the Europe's reemerging ghost, reminding it of the risks of wars, and defining Europe's own identity in terms of being susceptible to internecine war. This process has provided the background for security perceptions that are tied to regionalism and minorities constituting political security problems, for both states and region. This also paved the way for much of the state security that has been replaced by the societal sector and is articulated in terms of identity. In some countries the opposition to EU integration is articulated in national identity discourses (societal security); in other states in the more classical sovereignty language (political security) (Buzan and Waever, 2003:357-358).

Ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe was one of the most talked about security issues in the EU in the early 1990s especially in the context of regional stability. However, these identity-related security concerns were of high politics nature. That is, ethnic conflict is bad enough itself, but it is primarily taken to be a security threat to Western Europe. For, an ethnic conflict might drag those powers in on opposing sides and thus trigger the return to power politics among the EU core states. As a matter of fact, Bosnian and Kosovo war has showed this clearly in the post-Yugoslavia. Every country adopted differing foreign policies. Germany has recognized when Croatia announced itself as an independent state, but other countries such as France and Britain did not at the beginning of war. This process showed that possible power politics could again begin amongst the European countries. On the other side, reflections on conflicts in the Balkans were also

affected by the calculation of effects on EU integration / fragmentation dynamic.

Recently, however, things changed. One might think that the credibility of arguments pertaining to the threat of a return of the dangerous past has been in decline and so new ways of ensuring security are called for (C.A.S.E. Collective; 2006). The power of the security argument was tested in the context of the debates surrounding the Constitution but it turned out to be rather ineffective. During the external pressuring in the context of the run-up to the Iraq War and during the initial phase of that war, numerous American authors speculated about the EU's stance by doubting the latter's willingness and ability to stand up to the challenges faced in the 'War on Terror'. The question even arose whether there was a unified west and if there really is a transatlantic community strong enough to ward off the various new security-related challenges. They identified a gap to be bridged by acknowledging the existence of common threats, and the dangers embedded in international terrorism in particular. The approach to security thus had to become more centered instead of remaining predominantly on the level of the member states as it used to (Joenniemi, 2007:139).

The Changing Strategy of Combating Terrorism

There are certain instruments for threat prevention and protection from threats, elements of which can be found in some pillars. After the Maastricht Treaty, the Western European Union (WEU) was slowly integrated into the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The introduction of the 'Petersberg Task', established in June 1992 at the Ministerial Council of WEU, became an integral part of the ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) in article 17 of the Treaty of the EU. The Petersberg Tasks included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. At the meeting of the Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) of the member states held in La Gomera in 1995, La Gomera Declaration of EU JHA was published in which reference was made to terrorism as a threat to democracy. In the declaration it is noted that "information exchange between member states is very important in order to prevent and combat terrorist action effectively". On the other hand, in the treaty on EU of 1992, as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, terrorism is identified as both a matter of 'common interest' and as threat to achievement of making the EU an 'area of freedom, security and justice' (Lountzou, 2006:4).

Alternatively, the European Union Police Office (Europol) has also played significant role in combating

terrorism. Its legal status has been based on several international treaties, namely, Europol Convention, the Protocol on Immunities of Europol Officers and the Protocol on the Interpretation of the Europol Convention by the ECJ. The objective of Europol is 'within the framework of cooperation between the Member States ... to improve, by means of the measures referred to in this Convention, the effectiveness and cooperation of the competent authorities in the Member States in preventing and combating terrorism'. This objective was to be achieved by Europol through facilitating the exchange of information between Member States; obtaining, collating and analyzing information and intelligence; aiding investigations in the Member States; and maintaining a computer data base (Article 3 of Europol Convention) (Lavranos, 2003:2). Before the 9/11 attacks, Europol only had seven counter-terrorist specialists. The number changed rapidly and by 15 October 2001, a team of around thirty-five counter-terrorist specialists was formed.

In parallel with the EU policy against terrorism, some states employ significant methods in the context of the combating terrorism. France, Britain and Germany are important cases to check the relation between security and citizenship in line with the liberty and security discussion. These states have a historical past which evolved out of a political consensus of the democratic tradition to guard citizens from unwarranted state interference. On the other hand, they all expressed concerns about potential weaknesses in existing anti-terror legislation. They believed that individual freedom and liberty provided albeit unwittingly a niche for planning and organization of activities of the Al Qaeda cells. Indeed, the 9/11 attacks in the US were planned by a Hamburg, Germany, cell of Al Qaeda; Ahmed Rasim, who was arrested on his way to bomb Los Angeles International Airport. Another was linked with a French radical network; "shoe bomber" Richard Reid was recruited in a British Jail; and Zacharias Moussaoui, believed to be a member of the 9/11 hijackers, found his mission in a London mosque (Roy, 2005:360). A similar assessment applies to France where, soon after 9/11, anti-terrorist police detained eleven people in connection with attacks (Haubrich, 2003: 6).

In this framework, in Britain for instance, a stormy passage of a law through parliament took place, in which the government timetabled just sixteen hours over a three-day period for MPs to debate the infamous emergency measure: the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Emergency Bill 2001 through the legislative process on 13 December and it was given the Royal Assent the day after. Also, the National Identity Scheme, underpinned by the Identity Cards Act 2006, and other important legislation such as the Data Pro-

tection Act, were introduced to provide a comprehensive identity management service for all those who legally reside or work in the UK. Over time, this is expected to include all British citizens over 16 and foreign nationals (including European Economic Area nationals) in the UK. The legislative process in Germany saw a similar urgency without any serious discussion. Many changes to German law were expedited through both chambers of the parliament. On 14 December, after the 9/11, the 'Second Security Package' of laws was passed by an overwhelming majority of votes from all parties. Less than a week later, on 20 December, the package was also passed by the Bundesrat. The wide-ranging package of laws directed at civil liberties in German Republic involved changes to seventeen existing laws and five regulations. In France, the government proposed a series of exceptional security adjustments, part of the Day-to-day Security Law, which would infringe upon several rights of the French constitution. After only two weeks of deliberation the parliament approved the anti-terror package on 31 October' (Haubrich, 2003:8-10).

In these implementations, some categories of civil liberties were affected by the various legal stipulations introduced in the three countries. In France, Article 29 of the Anti-Terrorism legislation stipulated that internet providers have to store contact information of clients for twelve months. Bank accounts of a suspected terrorist may be monitored and banks as well as tax authorities have to produce the necessary data (Art. 59). The same is true for Germany where bank accounts, airline data and postal data can be accessed by the police. Internet providers and phone companies have to keep records for six months. On the other hand, in Germany according to legislations, employees of security-sensitive installations, such as water, postal services, energy, telecom, rail, radio, TV and governmental agencies, may be subject to background security checks. In Britain, internet and phone services providers need to keep communications data for two years, although the content of such communications is explicitly excluded from the stipulation.

In the context of security measures against terrorism and provision of 'daily life' security, identification card (ID) represents another very significant development for all of the three countries. While the French parliament saw no necessity to alter existing regulations, the German legislature decided, in article 7 and 11, to take biometric measures involving the scanning of fingerprints, retina or facial structure through a computer and storing it on the card. In Britain, the novel introduction of an ID-card is expected to be legalized especially after a much heated debate in public and parliament. In these regulations, ID

cards will provide legal protection to the UK residents, including foreign nationals, with an easy and *secure* way of proving *who* they are and *who* they are *not*. ID cards will be ultimately linked to their owners by unique biometric identifiers (for example, fingerprints), which mean we will have a much stronger way of protecting and *identifying* people's identities. In opposition to the normative concerns over protecting the privacy of the individual life details, they now have the full technological capacity to know not only identities but also fingerprints.

Citizenship as a new context of Security in Europe

In addition to references to economy and culture, EU citizenship policy is tied to a discourse on security. 'European citizenship' seeks to gain legitimacy by offering its members a high degree of protection from various external as well as internal threats. As set forth in the *Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union*, the Union is supposed to provide for its citizens 'an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime' (Council of the European Union 1997b: Title I, Article 2). At an early stage in 1996, the European Council stated that in order to 'bring the Union closer to its citizens' the EU had to succeed in 'meeting their need for security, which implies improving substantially the means and the instruments against terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking, as well as the policies on all aspects of asylum, visas and immigration' (European Parliament 1997: 3).

The connection between citizenship and immigration security is part of a process in which foreign identities of immigrants have increasingly been framed as signifying 'threats' and security problems, something from which the citizens have to be protected (Boer, 1995; Huysmans, 1995; Tesfahuney, 1998). Even as early as 1988, in Margaret Thatcher's Bruges speech at the College of Europe, the EC was constructed such 'that we cannot totally abolish frontier controls if we are also to protect our citizens from crime and stop the movement of drugs, of terrorists and of illegal immigrants' (Gordon, 1989:8). Another early case was during the winter of 1998 regarding the activities of 1200 Kurdish refugees in Italy. The then German interior minister Manfred Kanther declared that '[i]n view of this threatening situation, Western Europe must view itself as a security community'. He also referred to the Kurdish refugees as representing a 'criminal wave of migration' (Schmid, 1998). The fact that 'European citizenship' is related to the spe-

cific identities of immigrants and asylum seekers revealed an exclusionary strand within EU citizenship discourse.

Germany: 'Citizenship Test'-Good Citizenship

Most recent examples take this blame game to its extreme. For instance, many Germans are skeptical of immigrants nowadays, especially the Muslim immigrants. Some 2.5 million Turks live in Germany. After the unrest in Holland in late 2004 following the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh and the riots in France in autumn of 2006, integrating the country's largest minority has become a major issue for federal and state governments. The discovery of numerous terror cells in the country such as the "Hamburg Cell" which was instrumental in the 9/11 attacks, cast suspicious eyes on Muslims in general. Also Madrid and London bombings have strongly affected the German government perception against Muslim minority groups.

In the name of response to these developments, a new implementation has been introduced as an obligation by the German States, namely the citizenship test. The citizenship test legislation was welcomed on 1 January 2006 by the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg in Germany for Muslims who wanted to become German citizens. Populations who live in Baden are nearly 60 percentages Muslim according to a 2004 data. Clearly, the said test was aimed at Muslims but it caused such a controversy that the state had to downplay it. The test questions have a bizarre nature: there are 30 of them and 'they do make you blink' (Sells, 2006). The questions amount to a summary of liberal values and implicitly try to unearth the 'radical' Muslim attitudes towards public and private matters. The questions include: what do you think of democracy, political parties, and religious freedom? What would you do if you learned about a terrorist operation underway? Views of the attacks of September 11, 2001, are a "key issue," were Jews responsible for it? Were the 19 hijackers terrorists or freedom fighters? Finally, nearly two thirds of the questions concerned gender issues, such as women's rights, husbands beating wives, "honor killings," female attire, arranged marriages, polygyny, and homosexuality. Citizenship process was divided into two parts, one part consisted of language course, other relied on citizenship harmony course which are supported by conservative Christian Democrat Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union, who also want it to be an obligation (Deutsche Welle, 2006).

Clearly, many of the questions belong to the applicant's private and even intimate sphere and concern the core of their private lifestyle. This is an important

point in that citizenship test is applied only to Muslims. Indeed, the 57 member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) are required to answer the questions as part of the process to become German citizens (Dhimmi Watch, 2006). According to Baden-Württemberg interior ministry spokesman Günter Loos, the new questionnaire is meant to find out if a person shares Germany's "fundamental principles and values" (Smith, 2006). Naturally, other Europeans, Americans and citizens of other countries who are otherwise free from suspicion are not expected to come into contact with this test (Hawley, 2006).

In addition to this, a more shocking initiative came from Lower Saxony, where the interior minister, Uwe Schünemann, also a CDU member, stated that he would consider making radical Islamists wear electronic foot tags. To him, doing so would allow the German authorities "to monitor the approximately 3.000 *violence-prone* Islamists in Germany, the hate preachers [i.e., Islamist imams], and the fighters trained in foreign terrorist camps". For him, electronic tags are useful "for *violence-prone* Islamists who can't be expelled to their home countries because of the threat of torture" there. The electronic tagging of terror suspects is also not unprecedented. In Britain, the method has been used since March 2005 (Lettice, 2005) and has been applied to 10 suspects with reasonable success. Tagging potential terrorists and "hate preachers" and the whole concept of tagging is a new conceptual ground which aggressively aims to find out and pinpoint the ideological source of violence (Pipes, 2006).

It is known that electronic tags reveal only a geographic location, not words or actions of the carrier, which is not making sense when trying to deal with imams and other non-violent cadres. Also importantly, the mentioned citizenship test violates the existing laws. The test violates a key principle of Germany's Constitution, namely Article 3, which states: "No one may be prejudiced or favored because of their sex, their parentage, their race, their language, their homeland and origin, their faith or their religious or political opinions." The test questions wrongly promote a stereotyped view of Muslims, seeing them as a monolithic group of 'wife-beaters, sister-murderers and terrorists'. Needless to say, this does not take into account the fact that there is an enormous diversity within Islam. So instead of correcting prejudices and encouraging mutual understanding between Germany and its Muslim minority, the test does just the opposite. The citizenship test provides an image of close relationship between immigrants and terrorists in daily life contexts (Celik, 2006). This leads to setting up strong ties between German internal security and immigrants and redefines internal security over the religious identity of the immigrants.

The Return of the Liberal Sensibility?

What do all these mean? These new security practices (discussed above) of some European states indicate that there is a new attempt by the certain European states authorities to *reconstruct* a more 'material and objective' foundation for political practice. This attempt reflects the perceived belief that under the new circumstances of terror threats, European consensus on liberal universal human rights based protection and acceptance of cultural difference (as exemplified in freedom of thought, speech and of association) of certain social groups should be considerably revised if not firmly refuted. Particularly significant in this process are the new conceptions of knowledge about certain segments of society. The new knowledge about 'dangerous' subjectivities seem to herald a transformation in the accepted limits of political action, which has the problem of security at the centre. It is here that modern politics and security have *once again* been entangled and then realigned with serious consequences for the human rights of certain citizenry. We emphasize 'once again', because as explained below it has a solid historical exemplar.

Indeed, understanding newfound security policies and their effects on citizenship requires more than pointing to the sham conservative practices of once 'postmodern' EU states or the US. Broadly conceived, it requires coming to terms with a historical transformation, which seems to be reenacted in contemporary practice. As mentioned, this transformation is from post-national or postmodern political practice to a distinct modern practice called the 'liberal sensibility'. Couching the contemporary and controversial security practices of European states in the background of the liberal sensibility provides a fresh perspective to reflect on the problems, developments and debates about the battered civil and human rights of some European citizens. As forcefully argued by Michael C. Williams (1998), it is the 'liberal sensibility', which was shaped by the security concerns of the 17th century Europe (i.e., turmoil, violence and religious wars). As we mentioned, one of the central elements of the liberal sensibility is a 'negative identity practice', entailing 'a historical legacy of a conscious attempt to exclude identity concerns from the political realm'. The upshot of the liberal sensibility is that its progenitors strived to 'confute these beliefs in theory, *marginalize* them in practice and to replace them with new forms of understanding and political action, and in so doing to transform fundamentally the politics of violence and the nature of security' (Williams, 1998: 205, emphasis in original). Two other lengthy quotes summarize the discussion well:

'Jettisoning straightforward vision of truth and devaluing teleological and innatist claims that indivi-

duals (or certain individuals) have access to absolute truth, became a foundation of tolerance and the platform for an attack upon innatist ontological visions of social hierarch and social authority. These skeptical and voluntarist notions of became key planks of in the liberal platform against innatist justifications of social identity, political privilege and in the articulation of a liberal vision of equality and political right. It constitutes in short a negative ontology a reduction of individuals to purely atomistic individuality in the name of opposing innatist ontologies of privilege and and traditional authority and becomes an essential argument in opposing the absolutist state in the name of universal *citizenship* and legal equality, in liberalism the role of state is not to proclaim an identity but to disregard particular identities in favor of universal abstract universality. But this universality emerges not from a lack of understanding of of the importance of identity but from a conscious exclusion of its significance from the political realm in the light of the conflict it was seen to entail.' (Williams, 1998: 213)

'The liberal vision of security the conception of individual security and liberty and the constitutive political categories of private and public realms in liberalism are in significant ways constituted by an unwillingness to ask the question of identity. Historically speaking, this unwillingness was a *conscious choice*, reflecting a practical political stance and emerging out of the historical context of the early modern era where a concern for the dangers and the potential conflict which raising such issues had become paramount. For example reducing political identity to abstract individuality got rid not only of ascriptive hierarchies of class (the most common liberal focus) but ascriptive identities which were intrinsically implicated in the structure of violence' (Williams, 1998: 214).

In all, it can be claimed that the new security landscape in the European context after 9/11 indicates that there has been a transformation from post-national or postmodern political practice into the world view of the 'liberal sensibility' explained in these quotes. The contemporary and controversial security practices of some European states are better understood when couched in this formula. In short, because strongly held religious values and identities are taken as 'the primary source of violence and insecurity', societies are believed to be better off when these very values and identities are taken away with non-material and ideational realms of social life.

Conclusion

1. This study introduced a set of issues related to the politics of security. These issues are important, for they sometimes dominate political debates in the wider western world ever since the

terror attacks in September 2001 in the USA, in March 2004 in Spain and in July 2005 in the UK. These issues also invite us to rethink how the politics of security is theoretically and practically implemented in liberal democracies especially in transforming political and social relations.

2. As it emerged from our discussion there is a changing attitude towards certain groups and personalities with different identity roots in some European countries. This change is significant. Tests or other measures for separating a good citizen from a bad one is not simply for identifying those who are familiar to the values of the home countries. At stake is to find who is prone to violence, which to an important extent, relates to security concerns of the post 9/11 era. More significantly, these categorizations enable and perpetuate new social/moral hierarchies and boundaries within European communities often with negative consequences for hard-won civil rights. As explained, this change heralds the return of the liberal sensibility. Indeed, recent security discourses and policies of some European states can be linked to the 'liberal sensibility'. The latter was an initial and comprehensive answer to specific *security* problems of the 17th century Europe (religious wars, chaos, fear and uncertainty) that helped to constitute the modern transformation of the state and its practices. According to the liberal sensibility, strongly held religious values and identities are 'the primary source of violence and insecurity' and therefore societies are better off when these religious values and identities are taken away with the non-material and ideational realms of social life. Thinking in this way has the potential to provide a different perspective on the issues, developments and debates about the troubled civil and human rights of some European citizens. Similarly, the kind of contemporary political measures discussed in this paper are closely related to similar security concerns (fear of terror attacks and uncertainty therewith). They signify an uncertain security environment experienced in the European daily life.
3. In short, the religious and cultural identity is taken as the referent objects of internal security paradigms. The main concern of the new security measures and legislations are based on the assumption that providing a more secure daily life and creating good citizenry is strongly dependent on the countries' cultural and historical values. Those remaining outside are taken as the sources of the threat of religiously

motivated terror attacks. These measures also point to the difficulty of finding and erasing the sources of rage and reactions that are seen to be rooted in certain religious doctrines. In all, lack of engagement and reluctance to come to grips with the subtleties of sociology of religious groups lead some European states to adopt old solutions to new problems. Overall, European reactions to security problems seem to reassert and readjust an historical experience lived in the 17th century context of bloodshed, into 21st century. Hence, locating the related issues within the outlook sketched above has the potential to provide a different perspective on the issues, developments and debates about the troubled civil and human rights of some European citizens.

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The Return of the Liberal Sensibility in Europe

Summary

Post 9/11 landscape brought about a changing set of expectations about security in Europe. In line with the changing nature of international security conduct, security perceptions of some western European states now carry distinct cultural and religious marks. European security is no longer simply a *defensive* conception based on state-centric, external-military conception; but more an *offensive* logic which puts certain religious characteristics of citizenry as the source of insecurity. Amongst measures taken against such constructed threats, striking examples include the recent German policy of 'testing for citizenship' which is taken up to counter security threats after the terror bombings in Madrid and London. Through such performances of control, specific segments of European society, most notably men and women of Muslim faith, are put on spotlights because of their allegedly 'intrinsic' tendency toward religious radicalism and violence. In the name of response to violence and extremism, some European states resort to draconian measures against newfound agents of insecurity that lead them to diverge from the official narratives and practices of multiculturalism. The new security landscape in the European context after 9/11 indicates that there has been a transformation from post-national or postmodern political practice to a distinct modern practice called the

'liberal sensibility'. The upshot of the liberal sensibility is that strongly held religious values and identities of certain segments of society are 'the primary source of violence and insecurity' and states therefore have to do away with non-material and ideational realms of social life. The changed security paradigm after the 9/11 is thus giving momentum to the development of a new European security perception and politics, which is closely related to the 'liberal sensibility'. In this context, there is also a close relationship between a changing agenda of threat construction and the knowledge about a 'good citizen'. With the help of certain criteria shaped largely by Orientalist myths, some European states seem to little hesitate to generate further social and moral boundaries within their social and political spaces by taking new initiatives in the name of easing heightened security concerns. Overall, this new process leads to a reconsideration of the tolerant security conception. This also generates a different configuration of public sphere in relation to citizenship. That is, it generates situations in which some European states put discriminating emphasis on certain attributes of religious citizenry, especially Islamic societal elements. The present study aims to show that social and moral hierarchies are constructed new conceptions and policies of security in the European societies.